建筑安全管理机制博弈分析与改进*

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2021.11.004

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (11): 26-31.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2021.11.004

• 安全社会科学与安全管理 • 上一篇下一篇

建筑安全管理机制博弈分析与改进^*

杨鑫刚讲师, 王起全^** 教授

中国劳动关系学院安全工程学院,北京 100048

收稿日期:2021-08-28 修回日期:2021-10-14 出版日期:2021-11-28 发布日期:2022-05-28
通讯作者: ** 王起全(1976—),男,黑龙江鹤岗人,博士,教授,主要从事公共安全应急管理等方面的研究。E-mail:wqq_100@163.com。
作者简介:杨鑫刚 (1982—),男,河北邯郸人,硕士,讲师,主要从事运筹与管理、建筑安全等方面的研究。E-mail:xingang2005@126.com。
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC0804900);中国劳动关系学院2020年“中央高校基本业务费专项资金”项目(20ZYJS013)。

Game analysis and improvement of construction safety management mechanism

YANG Xingang, WANG Qiquan

College of Safety Engineering, China University of Labor Relations, Beijing 100048, China

Received:2021-08-28 Revised:2021-10-14 Online:2021-11-28 Published:2022-05-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为探究适用建筑行业特点的安全管理机制,利用博弈论研究建筑安全管理过程中各方利益的对立统一关系,深入分析监理单位、建筑企业、施工工人之间的关系,构建三者之间的两方以及三方博弈模型,分别利用纯策略和混合策略意义下纳什均衡的求解方法,得到三者利益之间的量化制约关系;分别对建筑企业与监理单位,建筑企业与施工工人,监理单位、建筑企业、施工工人三方进行博弈分析;结合博弈分析结果对我国建筑安全管理机制提出改进建议。结果表明:加大工人的违章处罚,增加工人按章操作的收益和奖励,工人会选择按章操作;减少企业的安全管理成本,加大企业不执行安全策略的处罚及事故善后成本,企业会选择执行安全策略;降低监理单位的监理成本,加大监理单位的违法成本,监理单位会选择监管策略。

关键词: 博弈分析, 建筑安全管理机制, 混合策略, 纳什均衡, 激励相容

Abstract: In order to develop a safety management mechanism applicable to features of construction industry, game theory was used to study the opposition and unity of the interest of all parties in the process of construction safety management. Relationship between supervision institutions, construction companies, and construction workers was thoroughly analyzed, and two-party and three-party game models between them were constructed. Secondly, pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution methods were adopted to obtain a quantitative restriction relationship between interest of the three sides. Then, game analysis was conducted between construction enterprises and supervision institutions, construction enterprises and the construction workers, and between these parties respectively. Finally, suggestions for improvement of construction safety management mechanism were put forward based on the analysis. The results show that workers will choose to operate in accordance with regulations if punishment for violations are intensified or benefits and rewards for compliance are increased. By reducing cost of safety management, and increasing penalties for companies not implementing safety strategies and the handling cost for accidents, it can encourage enterprises to implement safety strategy. And supervision institutions will also choose to execute supervision strategy if its cost to supervise is reduced and that for illegal conducts is increased.

Key words: game analysis, construction safety management mechanism, mixed strategy, Nash equilibrium, incentive compatibility

中图分类号:

X921

杨鑫刚, 王起全. 建筑安全管理机制博弈分析与改进^*[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2021, 31(11): 26-31.

YANG Xingang, WANG Qiquan. Game analysis and improvement of construction safety management mechanism[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2021, 31(11): 26-31.

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建筑安全管理机制博弈分析与改进^*

Game analysis and improvement of construction safety management mechanism

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